Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 28

Issue 1

Article 12

1939

Right of Vendor to Maintain Action for Injury to Property by a Third
Party
J. Wirt Turner Jr.
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Torts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Turner, J. Wirt Jr. (1939) "Right of Vendor to Maintain Action for Injury to Property by a Third Party,"
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 28: Iss. 1, Article 12.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol28/iss1/12

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

CASE COMMENTS
RIGHT OF VENDOR TO MAINTAIN ACTION FOR INJURY TO
PROPERTY BY A THIRD PARTY.
The vendor of land made a writing in the form of a deed to the
purchaser. There was no certificate of acknowledgment.
The last
paragraph stated that the vendor would deliver a general warranty
deed upon payment of the whole of the purchase price (a part of which
had been paid on execution of the instrument) in 1946. The purchaser went into possession immediately. In this action, the vendor
sued defendant (a third party) for damages for destruction of a
stone wall and underpass on the land. Defendant demurred on the
ground that there was a defect in parties plaintiff. The demurrer was
sustained, and the vendor appealed. Held: Affirmed. The writing
conveyed the legal title as between the immediate parties. But even
though the writing be considered a mere contract to sell, the vendor
nevertheless could not maintain his action without alleging that the
security for the remainder of the purchase price was impaired. The
purchaser was the real party in interest and a necessary party to the
action. Adams v. Boone Fiscal Court, 271 Ky. 729, 113 S. W. (2d) 1,
(1937).
The conclusion that this writing served as a deed conveying legal
title as between the parties is based upon Ferrell et al. v. Childress
et al.' In the Ferrell case, the intention of the parties to convey legal
title was clear and definite, and the only discrepancy was the lack of a
certificate of acknowledgment. Whether an instrument is a deed or
a bond for title must be determined by the party's intention derived
from the whole Instrument.' In the instant case, the fact that the
instrument provided for subsequent delivery of the deed upon full
payment of the purchase price, tends to show that the intention of the
172 Ky. 760, 189 S. W. 1149 (1916).
'Here the parties made an ineffectual attempt to convey their
respective interests in the property in question. The court said: "If
one has made an ineffectual attempt to make a conveyance and has
signed an instrument of writing with that purpose, but his effort
fails because of the failure of an official to make the proper certificate,
the writing signed by him is not void for all purposes." The court
held that such an instrument conveys legal title as between the immediate parties. Id. at 764.
3 "This court has held that whether an instrument of writing is a
deed or a bond for title must be determined by the intention of the
parties derived from the whole instrument." Solomon v. Keesee, 156
Ark. 387, 246 S. W. 469 (1923). "The intent will control technical
terms, for the intent and not the words is the essence of every agreement." Chapman v. Glassell, 13 Ala. 50, 48 Am. Dec. 41 (1848).
See
also: Roberts v. Abbott, 48 Cal. App. 779, 192 Pac. 345 (1920); and
Smith v. Bunston, 72 Mont. 535, 234 Pac. 836 (1925).
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parties was not to make a present conveyance. Furthermore, an agreement to make a conveyance in the future can be inferred from the
granting clause "do hereby sell and agree to convey"., But even though
the granting clause is regular, the courts generally hold that the writing
will be construed as an executory contract if it Is shown that the
parties contemplated subsequent delivery of a deed of conveyance'
This instrument, therefore, was intended by the parties to be an
executory contract to sell, rather than a present conveyance of the
property.
The question remains whether the vendor should be permitted to
maintain the action for the injury to the freehold if the instrument has
the effect of a title bond only.
The conclusion that the purchaser and not the vendor is the
proper party to maintain this action is based upon Benjamin v. Din7
widdie. This case held merely that the purchaser acquires a vested,
equitable title to the real estate as a consequence of the right to specific
performance. From this holding the court in the instant case concludes, in effect, that the purchaser, as a consequence of the right to
specific performance, is the real party in interest and a necessary
party to the action.
No question of possession was involved in reaching this conclusion. The action here, however, was to recover damages for an injury
to the freehold, an action of trespass, and was necessarily, therefore,
8
Without possession, constructive possession, or
a possessory action.

"If the parties had intended this instrument to operate as a conveyance in praesenti, why does the obligor stipulate, at a future day
to give, and the obligee to receive, title in fee simple to the land?"
Chapman v. Glassell, 13 Ala. 50, 48 Am. Dec. 41 (1848). Accord:
Dunaway v. Day, 163 Mo. 415, 63 S. W. 731 (1901); Solomon v. Keesee,
156 Ark. 387, 246 S. W. 469 (1923); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 208 N. Y. S.
734, 212 App. Div. 531 (1927); In re Aishouse's Estate, 304 Pa. 481,
156 At. 69, 96 A. L. R. 379 (1931).
r "Although the instrument uses the words 'grant, bargain and sell',
they are coupled with the added words 'and agree to convey'. When
construed with reference to these words and the surrounding circumstances, it would seem to have been their intention to execute an
executory instrument." Solomon v. Keesee, 156 Ark. 387, 246 S. W.
469 (1923).
'In Hoffman v. Hoffman, 208 N. Y. S. 734, 212 App. Div. 531 (1927),
although the instrument recited that "I do hereby sell and convey"
certain property at a specified price, the court held that the instrument
was not a deed, but merely an agreement to convey, in view of a provision for subsequent delivery of a deed upon payment of the full purchase price. Accord: Dunaway v. Day, 163 Mo. 415, 63 S. W. 731
(1901); Snow v. Prince, 13 S. W. (2d) 342, (Tex. Civ. App.) (1929);
McClung v. Sewell Valley R. Co., 110 W. Va. 621, 159 S. E. 521 (1931).
1226 Ky. 106, 10 S. W. (2d) 620 (1928).
'The vendor might have maintained an action in the nature of a
mortgagor's action to recover damages for injury to the freehold resulting in impairment of his security. The vendor holds the legal title
merely as security for payment of the purchase price, and, as in the
case of the mortgagor, he must allege that his security is impaired
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the right to immediate possession, trespass q.c.f. will not lie! Whether
the vendor or the purchaser is entitled to maintain this action should,
therefore, be a consequence of the right to immediate possession,"
rather than a consequence of the right to specific performance." Though
there was no express provision In the contract for giving the purchaser
possession, such a provision can be implied from the stipulation that
the purchaser must keep all improvements insured," the provision that
the purchaser should pay all taxes," plus the additional fact that the
before he may maintain the action. In the instant case, the vendor
failed to allege impairment of security and as a consequence was not
permitted to recover upon this theory.
'Shipman, Common Law Pleading (1923), p. 75, and authorities
cited therein.
11Generally the right of the purchaser to recover for injury to the
freehold Is made to depend upon a grant of possessory rights under the
contract. In Moyer v. Scott, 30 Mich. 345 (1874), where the contract
was silent as to possession, the cause of action (trover) was held to be
in the vendor because he had the right to possession, and that the
defendant should not be subjected to double liability. The court made
the following statement: "Unless they (the purchasers) have acquired
possessory rights, the holder of the title must be the only person who
can legally complain in a court of law of injuries to the freehold." Id.
at 347. Accord: Garrett v. Beers, 97 Kans. 525 P. 2 (1916) (purchaser
In possession may maintain action for damages to the freehold);
Witheral v. Muskegon Booming Co., 68 Mich. 48, 35 N. W. 758 (1888);
Ives v. Cress, 5 Pa. St. 118, 47 Am. Dec. 401 (1847) (vendor cannot
maintain action for injury to freehold occurring when purchaser was
in possession.
" However, the consequence of the right to immediate possession
does not necessarily determine which of the parties should be entitled,
ultimately, to the proceeds derived from this possessory action. The
solution to this problem might depend upon who must bear the risk of
loss. It Is obvious that the party who must bear the loss is the proper
party to receive compensation for such loss. Although the cases are
not entirely in accord in Kentucky, there is substantial reason and
authority for the conclusion that Kentucky follows Lord Eldon's view
(that the purchaser bears the risk of loss as a consequence of the right
to specific performance, and not as a consequence of possession or the
right thereto) in Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. Jr. 653 (1801). See Note
(1935) 24 Ky. L. Jour. 86; Note (1927) 24 Mich. L. Rev. 838; Marks v.
Tlchenor, 85 Ky. 536, 4 S. W. 225 (1887); Cottingham v. Insurance Co.,
Cf. Wheeler v. Gahan, 206 Ky. 366,
90 Ky. 439, 14 S. W. 417 (1890).
267 S. W. 227 (1924); Martin Grocery Co. v. Meng Co., 212 Ky. 469, 279
Since the loss must, therefore, fall upon the purS. W. 661 (1926).
chaser in the Instant case, It would seem that he is the proper person,
ultimately, to receive compensation, as a consequence of the right to
specific performance.
2"The agreement expressly provides that the plaintiff (purchaser)
and keep up the improvements.
should pay all taxes, * * *
* * * It (the contract) did, by necessary implication, vest the right
of possession in him (the purchaser)." Krakow v. Wille, 125 Wis.
284, 103 N. W. 1121 (1905). See also: Corning v. Loomis, 111 Mich.
23, 69 N. W. 85 (1896); Olson v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 89 Minn.
280, 94 N. W. 871 (1903).
""To be sure, the agreement in terms does not award possession
to the vendee, but he was to pay the taxes and did in fact enter in
possession immediately, indicating unmistakably that that was the
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purchaser entered into immediate possession."
The purchaser, not
the vendor, had the right to immediate possession, and is therefore
the proper party to maintain this possessory action.
J. WiuT TUR na,J&
CONFLICT

LAWS-JURISDICTION TO GRANT DIVORCEDAVIS v. DAVIS.
In 1925 H. was granted a divorce a mensa et thoro from W. In
the District of Columbia. Subsequently, H. filed a petition In the
District of Columbia to have the alimony decree granted in the separation set aside, relying mainly upon a decree of absolute divorce obtained
by him in the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, on grounds
which did not constitute grounds for divorce in the District of Columbia.
In the Virginia action W. was personally served with process in the
District of Columbia. She appeared and filed a plea stating that she
appeared "specially and for no other purpose than to file this plea
to the jurisdiction of the court." A commissioner in chancery was
appointed, and he reported that in his opinion H. was a resident of
Arlington County, Virginia, and that the court had jurisdiction to hear
and determine the case. After her exceptions to the commissioner's
report as contrary to the evidence were overruled, W. did not plead
further, and the divorce was granted. Held: Decree of the Virginia
court must be given full faith and credit by the District of Columbia.
Davis v. Davis. - U. S. -, 59 Sup. Ct. 3 (1938).
If the petitioner was actually domiciled in Virginia for the period
required by the statute in that state, the Virginia decree is valid, and
this case states the law under the "full faith and credit clause" of the
Constitution.'
Generally, it may be said that the forum which has jurisdiction to
grant divorce is the forum of the matrimonial domicil.2 However, it Is
usually held that the matrimonial domicil is separable for the purpose
of divorce.3 The old principle of the law of domestic relations that the
OF

intention of the parties. Payment of taxes and interest imply that
occupancy was expected." Sample v. Lyons, 69 N. Y. S. 378, 59 App.
Div. 456 (1901).
See Welch v. Hover Schiffner Co., 75 Wash. 130, 134
P. 526 (1913); Krakow v. Wille, 125 Wis. 284, 103 N. W. 1121 (1905).
11Krakow v. Wille, supra, n. 12. See also: Sample v. Lyons, 69
N. Y. S. 378, 59 App. Div. 456 (1901).
Art. VI, sec. 1.
2 See Goodrich on Conflict of Laws (2d ed.) Discussion sec. 123 on
"Basis of Jurisdiction for Divorce", (1938).
a Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 108, 19 L. Ed. 604 (1869) ; Chap
man v. Chapman, 129 Ill. 386, 21 N. D. 806 (1889); Jenness v. Jenness,
24 Ind. 355, 87 Am. Dec. 335 (1865); Sworski v. Sworski, 75 N. H. 1, 70
A. 119 (1908); Collin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375 (1867); Craven v. Craven, 27
Wis. 418 (1871).

